In June 1940 the whole strategic balance of the previously-quiet Mediterranean was upended by the collapse of France and by Italy's entry into the war. The latter had a powerful fleet, well-placed geographically to dominate the central narrows.

The British Mediterranean Fleet, under Admiral Cunningham, was divided between its bases at Gibraltar, Malta and Alexandria, of which the first and last are about 3220 km (2,000 miles) distant. Malta, near the mid-point, was recognized as being a key position, to be defended at all costs, but the Axis powers, apparently not having envisaged a North African war, realized its strategic significance too late.

Like the German fleet, the Italian navy had no aircraft-carriers, its sphere of influence, theoretically, being easily serviced by land based airpower. Lacking this latter luxury, the British appreciated fully the value of a carrier and one, at least, was usually attached. Before the onset of hostilities in the Mediterranean, the single flight deck available, HMS Glorious, was transferred to the Indian Ocean on a raider hunt and thence to European waters to replace the lost HMS Courageous. When the Glorious, too, was lost in June 1940, HMS Eagle was sent to join Cunningharri s flag, reinforced further in the August by arrival of the new HMS Illustrious. Between them, these two ships could muster 42 Fairey Swordfish torpedo/search/reconnaissance aircraft (the much-loved 'Stringbag') and 19 fighters comprising Fairey Fulmars and Gloster Sea Gladiators.

The Royal Navy was active from the outset, passing reinforcements particularly from west to east and building up the forces at Malta. While the Italian fleet was often observed at sea it remained fairly passive, but the latent threat that it posed could not be ignored.

The Italian fleet's main base was the southem port of Taranto, only a few hour's dash from

Malta. The British, old Mediterranean hands, had long planned an air strike on the port as a war-game, a possibility considered more seriously in 1935 as a step in the graded response to Mussolini s invasion of Abyssinia.

This plan was dusted-off once two carriers~ were available, and preparations began for a raid on Trafalgar Day, 21 October 1940. To this end the RAF, using Malta-based Martin Marylands, began a regular reconnaissance schedule, but a delay was imposed by a fire in the hangar of the Illustrious, which destroyed or damaged several aircraft.

Urgency was then injected by the unexpected Italian invasion of Greece on 28 October, which presented the British with a whole new range of naval commitments. Clearly the east-west route through the Mediterranean had to be kept open, and dealing with Taranto would be a step in the right direction.

It was resolved to hit the base at the next favorable moon-phase, on 11 November, naval activity being disguised in a series of convoy movements, necessary because the enemy anticipated an attack but needed to be kept unaware of its timing. Unfortunately the venerable Eagle, which had been heavily shaken-up by bombing following the action off Calabria in the previous July, had to withdraw with a major failure of her aircraft fuelling system. She left illustrious with a legacy of five night-trained Swordfish and crews to make up numbers.

The fleet sailed from Alexandria on 6 November 1940, covering convoys to both Crete and Malta, and the passing-through of

naval units. On 8 November the Illustrious fighters were kept busy against would-be shadowers and bombers and, on the following day, three of the Eagles Swordfish had to 'ditch' because of contaminated fuel.

On the morning of the attack, one of the carrier's Fulmars called at Malta for the latest reconnaissance update. It showed that delay had served the British well, for five of the enemy's six battleships were at home, the sixth joining during the day. All were lying in the Mar Grande, the spacious outer harbour which, enclosed by offshore breakwaters, is an elliptical body of water, roughly 6.4 km (4 miles) along its major axis, which lies approximately north west to south east. About the center of the landward side lies the town of Taranto, with a narrow channel leading to the Mar Piccolo, the inner harbour, in which lay cruisers and destroyers, together with a seaplane base.

A final air attack on the British on the afternoon of 11 November should have given the Italians cause for concern through the very nature of the task group's composition, but there was no apparent reaction. In dead calm conditions under a three-quarter moon, the first 12 Swordfish lumbered, heavily loaded, into the air. By 20.40 they were all away on the 275-km (170-mile) two-hour flight, their crews freezing in their open cockpits. Long before their arrival the port was marked by a multicolored cascade of fire, arcing aimlessly in the clean air, the jittery Italians being warned of aircraft noises by listening apparatus but, fortunately, lacking night-fighters.

At 23.02, the first British flare blossomed at 13'10 m (4,500 ft) followed by others in a neat line at 805-m (880-yard) intervals. The torpedo aircraft had gone their own way, splitting further into two groups to attack from the south west and north west. Of these the first had to fly between the invisible balloon cables, and here the stately 85 mph (137 km/h) of a Stringbag was a positive advantage. All crews spoke of the sheer volume of fire thro from all sides but, apparently, there 'no search light support

In the open cockpit of a Swordfish one was very close to the action. Like whirring grey moths the aircraft quartered the anchorage, rumbling in and out at below funnel height, the tracer following in a multitude of flat arcs. Miraculously, only one of the aircraft was lost, while a single hit put the Cavour on the bottom and another holed the new Littorio's port quarter. The bombers, meanwhile, had raised a hearty blaze in the seaplane base, which thus served as a beacon to welcome the second strike, about 40 minutes behind the first.

Again the flare-line worked well throwing the stationary Italian ships into sharp relief~ Only five torpedo aircraft were in this group,' arriving from the north after a diversionary jink in the course. From a height of barely 6 m (20 ft) the torpedoes went in, one by one, the attackers dodging each other, the targets and the balloons. One crashed and another was hit; but so was the Duilio and again, the Littorio . The bombers suffered from faulty fusing and

In the early hours, close aboard the Greek Island of Cephalonia, the illustrious received her brood as they arrived singly and in pairs, tattered and elated, For the loss of only two aircraft, three enemy battleships had been bottomed, confirmed on the following day by aerial reconnaissance. In deep water they would have been lost, as at was. two were eventually salvaged and returned to service.

The value of the attack lay in its demonstration of the sheer economy of a well-planned carrier strike, the further moral ascendancy given to the outnumbered Royal Navy and the withdrawal of all Italian heavy units to points north. Cunningham signaled, on the following day 'Illustrious manuever well executed and indeed it was so.