AXIS VERSUS ALLIED DESTROYER DESIGN

Most of the main warring fleets possessed goodly numbers of destroyers, and surprisingly many were of flawed design, largely the result of over ambition on treaty-limited displacements. The Allies were probably better off in this respect, only the Americans having to wage continual war against a naval staff that appeared to want to sink its ships under the sheer weight of torpedo tubes, weapons which for long they seemed loath to use freely. The British had probably got the balance about correct with their cruisers acknowledging limitations to get the large number of hulls seen as necessary for world-wide duties. In both types the temptation was avoided /except with the 'Tribals') to add armament to the limit simply to match a foreign precedent. This was perhaps fortunate as the rather modest and austere results proved to have adequate all-round ability while not being exceptional in any one direction, they could be relied upon to be usable in any condition.

Between the world wars the French exerted great influence through the magnificent series of big ships they could afford to build as they were not tied to obtaining the greatest number of hulls on their allocated total displacement figure. The UK did not respond as she could not afford to devote so much tonnage to comparatively few ships and, in any case, did not view the French as serious candidates for a maritime war.

While the big Frenchmen were not totally devoid of top weight problems, they really looked the part and encouraged both the Italians and Germans to build in a like image. Of these, the former approached the 'problem' more logically, producing the 'Capitani Romani', which were more scout cruisers than destroyers but had both the speed and firepower to challenge any of their French counterparts. Had they only been built m time they could have posed a major threat to those British Mediterranean convoys which lacked air cover. The Italians were also producing a true large destroyer class in the so-called 'Medaglie d'Oro', but again these ships never materialized in time. As in the usual capricious ways of war, the French ships that had inspired them were no longer a threat after the end of 1942, while the Italians found themselves instead fighting the British a situation which in the 1930s would have appeared a remote possibility after the latter's craven era of general appeasement at almost any cost.

The Italian fleet destroyer was an endangered species from the outset, the confined waters of the Mediterranean sea exposing it to every sort of attack (carrier- and land-based air, surface ship and submarine) without sufficient sea room in which to lose itself.

Very few were actually sunk while engaged in fleet action many fell victim to the endless requirements of the North African supply run but, for the greater part, it was sheer attrition from all causes. To be fair, the British suffered the same problems and also took many losses in these waters.

From the point of view of damage inflicted upon the enemy, the Italian small destroyers, or torpedo boats were far more effective than the larger fleet units, proving themselves adept at countering the British submarines that were playing havoc in the central Mediterranean. Like their larger compatriots, however, they were little disposed to create situations that would allow them to exploit their principal weapon, the torpedo One reason for this was the insistence, probably the result of top weight problems, on fitting the small 450-mm (17.72m) torpedoes. These had half the range and considerably less speed than the 533-mm (21-in) weapons, necessitating a closer approach to the target. This was an unhealthy habit by daylight but, where it could have been possible by darkness, the Italians found themselves up against radar-laid gunnery, to which they had no answer.

Italian losses in destroyers were very high. As with the French, they reflected a war of varying fortunes and allegiances, fighting both for and against the Allies while taking casualties in both cases. While in the fleet context they appeared poorly led and motivated, achieving little they worked well and gave valuable service when individually tasked. This reflected the Italian character in general, best given to opportunity to work alone rather than subordinating highly individual personality to group discipline.

So little does one hear of German destroyer activity that one could be excused for assuming that they built few. This was not so 43 destroyers and 48 torpedo boats being completed before May 1945. The German high command never

appreciated the potential of its surface fleet and the destroyers, as part of it, spent the war heavily underutilized.

Recommencing destroyer construction in the early 1930s after a 15-year break, the Germans produced in the 'Maass' type a very conventional ship. Yet it was well armed, of adequate size and effective. It could outperform the contemporary British destroyer but, like it appeared perhaps nondescript. For the British this was adequate, but the Germans looked for more dash, feeling the need to respond to French practice. The result was large and over gunned ships that were poor sea boats, suffering not only from excessive top weight but unreliable guns and worse unreliable machinery.

The latter resulted from the other beguiling principle that high steam pressures mean compact machinery; in practice it means endless technical problems (a path along which the Americans were still toiling in the 1960s1 and the stimulant to develop plans for destroyers unique in having combined steam and diesel propulsion and, finally, diesel propulsion alone. The lack of priority accorded to surface ship production (correctly, for the submarine war was far more cost-effective) prevented these ships ever getting beyond the prototype stage.

The Japanese probably had the clearest ideas on what they wanted of their destroyers Like those produced on both sides, their designs tended to be initially deficient in both AA and AS potential but, as ship killers, they were excellent. From the 'Fubukis' of the late 1920s they standardized on the 127mm (5-in) gun and the 610-mm (24-iy torpedo. Though stability ranges were sometimes inadequate, a whole series of derived classes were so armed without any essays into larger guns (probably because the average Japanese loader could not handle heavier rounds) while the 610-mm Type 93 or 'Long Lance' torpedo proved to be devastating, long-ranged, reliable and, unusually complete with a full kit of reloads. Unlike the Italians, the Japanese operated best in groups, the quality of the ships being matched by that of their training. Up to the special-purpose 'Akitsukis' there had been great consistency of design, the main failing of which was that it adhered to pre-war standards producing high-quality ships but in wholly inadequate numbers. Only with the' Matsus' did the Japanese produce a utility series, too late to have any real impact.

An interesting design feature common to the majority of Axis destroyers of all three navies was a preference for twin-gun mountings and an avoidance of superimposed guns forward. A six-gun armament was thus achieved by superimposing the after mountings. Compared with British destroyers this allowed 50 per cent more barrels on a shorter axial length, at only small penalty in top weight and associated capsizing moment. A good armament facing aft was often 2n asset to a type of ship frequently pursued (and, if this sounds a mite defensive, there existed the British precedent of shipping aft-facing 152.4-mm/6-in guns on 101 .6-mm/4-in armed light cruisers during World War I). Only with the Type II 'Hunts' did the British adopt the layout, HMS Savage being a further special case with a prototype twin 'Battle' class gun house forward and two single 114.3mm (4.5-in) guns aft.

While, later in the war, all Axis destroyers had their AA armament enhanced in greater or lesser degrees, they proved equally poor AA platforms and just as vulnerable as Allied ships to air attack. Ultimately, in over five years of attritional war, the main failing of the Axis was its inability to replace its losses having failed to foresee the consequence of a prolonged conflict with traditional sea powers.