Though designed to inhibit explosive competition in capital warship construction among the recently victorious powers, the terms of the Washington Treaty of 1921 had the reverse effect on cruisers, Its limits of a 10,000-ton displacement and a 203-mm (8-in) caliber armament rapidly became the frame into which naval designers packed the greatest possible potential.

The UK, however, did not want a few powerful ships so much as a large number with good endurance to police her trade routes and further her imperial interests. Only reluctantly, therefore, did she produce a class of 203-mm (8-in) heavy cruisers as an 'answer' to foreign competition. This was the 'A' or 'County' class of 13 stately three-funneled vessels commencing with the four 'London's' of the 1925-6 estimates. Their excellent armament, endurance, speed and standards of habitability were, however, bought at the expense of protection. They also had a unit price tag of £2 million, regarded as excessive in a period of general cutback in appropriations.

Though seven 'B' class cruisers were planned originally, only two were completed because of successive cutbacks. First of the class was HMS York, followed into service in 1931 by HMS Exeter, fourth of the name and constructed, appropriately, in Devonport dockyard.

At the outbreak of World War II in September 1939 the Exeter, together with the 'County' class HMS Cumberland and the 6-in 'Leander' class HMS Ajax, comprised the South American division of the forces of the Commander in-Chief South Atlantic. This enormous tract of near-featureless water was significant mainly for being traversed by several extremely important trade routes.

A fortnight before war commenced, two Panzerschiffe sailed unobtrusively into the Atlantic. One was the Admiral! Graf Spee. Her orders, in the event of hostilities, were to disrupt trade but avoid action with warships that could cause her injury far from dockyard facilities.

The enemy commenced operations near the end of September, sinking the Booth liner Clement off the Brazilian coast. To catch the Admiral Graf Spee the French and British put together eight separate hunting groups, of which Force G comprised the South American division reinforced by the Royal New Zealand Navy's HMNZS Achilles, a sister to the Ajax. Under the command of Commodore Henry Harwood, these four ships had an enormous area to cover but, despite the raider's widespread depredations, Harwood was convinced that she would eventually strike at the important River Plate' trade. His convictions were well-founded, though when his force sighted the Admiral GrafSpee off the Uruguayan coast on the morning of 13 December, his concentration was of only three ships, the Cumberland being near the Falklands.

Harwood, like Nelson before him, had thoroughly discussed his plans with his captains and dispositions were smoothly carried out to split the enemy's fire. The Exeter took one side and the two light cruisers the other. Fire was opened at over 1Z3~5m (19,000 yards) the Admiral Graf Spee first taking on the two light cruisers, whose volume of fire must, initially, have appeared more of a threat. She very soon switched, however, as the larger splashes of the Exeter's 203-mm (8-in) weapons began to straddle.

Turning nearly 180° from her original course of near south east, the Admiral Graf Spee put the Exeter slightly abaft her port beam, with all six 280-mm ( 11-in) guns bearing. Simultaneously, she engaged the two smaller ships with her 150-mm (5.9-in) secondary armament.

The enemy had the advantage of a radar set which could pass ranges to the gun layers and the Exeter was soon hard hit by three 280-mm ( 11-in) projectiles, losing a turret and her steering. Under emergency control, she continued doggedly, launching her starboard torpedoes without effect. Hit again, she developed a starboard list and turned in that direction to fire her portside torpedoes, which were again evaded. Her injuries began to tell on both the accuracy and rate of her fire.

Still shooting well at a comfortable range, the Admiral Graf Spee hit her twice again, putting another turret out of action and starting a serious fire. Blinded and burning, the gallant Exeter was spent; pulling away, she disengaged to the south.

Comparatively untroubled to this point, the two light cruisers had to maneuver to deter the German from making after the Exeter. The enemy's resolve seemed broken, however, and from an hour after the action commenced, her course was generally westward, the Ajax and ~Achilles hanging on to her, eventually shepherding her into Montevideo.

Though the Graf Spee had lost 36 killed (in comparison, the Exeter alone suffered 61 dead) the damage from the 2'1 hits that she had suffered was superficial. Nevertheless, without hope of making it back to Germany, this still formidable fighting machine was scuttled by her crew. This, and the suicide of her respected commander, Langsdorff, brought a somber note to what had been to the British a sparkling little action.

Patched up at Port Stanley, the Exeter returned to the UK for a considerable period in dockyard hands before proceeding to the Far East to meet a worsening situation. Pearl Harbor tends to overshadow the quite brilliant campaign through which the Japanese took the Dutch East Indies in the following months. Using all available air and sea power, they conducted a bewildering series of feints and landings to keep the Allies permanently unbalanced.

A scratch collection of Australian, British, Dutch and American warships made up the so-called ABDA force which, by the end of February 1942, was damaged, worn out and demoralized. With Singapore gone, Java was the last major bastion left before Australia itself was threatened, and two enemy forces were reported approaching on 2~ February. The larger (eastern) group comprised 41 escorted merchantmen carrying the main invasion force.

Under the Dutch Admiral Karel Doorman, a force of five cruisers (including the Exeter) and 10 destroyers sailed to intercept them. On paper, the enemy covering force of four cruisers and 15 destroyers was comparable, but in individual size, armament and morale it was far superior. After an opening gunnery duel, the Japanese launched a determined torpedo attack. This virtually coincided with the Exeter, second in the cruiser line, being hit in a boiler room by a 203-mm (8-in) shell from the Nachi. Blazing, her speed cut to only 5 kts, the Exeter pulled out of line, those ships astern being thrown into confusion.

Covered by four destroyers making smoke, the Exeter turned south, carrying, unfortunately, the liaison officer and codebooks through which the Dutch-speaking Doorman communicated with the remainder of his English-speaking force.

Successive probes by Doorman s reorganized group against the Japanese transports were successfully parried by the enemy, the Allies being forced back to the point where the limping Exeter again became involved. Hard pressed by enemy light cruisers and destroyers, she was saved by her own destroyers' spirited defence, for the loss of HMS Electra.

Again the main thrust of the action flowed to the northward as a sporadic series of short engagements. After dark, disaster struck as Doorman was killed when both his Dutch cruisers were sunk, but the Exeter and her remaining screen meanwhile made Surabaya safely. Refuelled and patched, the little group sailed the following evening to attempt an escape to Ceylon, the ABDA combined force had ceased to exist. They were spotted even as they left by Japanese reconnaissance aircraft and, though she was capable of 23 kts again by daybreak on 1 March, the Exeter found herself steering into a fresh enemy force of four heavy cruisers and four destroyers. Quarter was neither offered nor sought, and the unequal action lasted for over two hours. The Exeter was served valiantly by her two destroyers, HMS Encounter and the USS Pope, which made smoke and a succession of offensive sorties against the Japanese force, which had split to attack from each side. Inevitably the cruiser eventually succumbed, rolling over to starboard after sustaining gun and torpedo hits. Her gallant destroyers survived her by a bare half hour.

The valour and sacrifice shown by the Allied force was virtually for nothing, delaying the Japanese schedule by hardly 24 hours. The action underlined the high efficiency of the Imperial Japanese Navy and graphically demonstrated the continuing need for Allied fleets to work together regularly to standardize procedures. If that lesson were learned and carried through to current NATO practice, the Exeter and her compatriots did not perish in vain.