May 1942 saw the Japanese consolidating their hold on the Solomon's, from which they could threaten not only the New Hebrides and Fiji but also Australia itself. Encouraged by their great success of Midway, the Americans resolved that the Solomon's would be the point at which the seemingly inexorable enemy tide would be stemmed. A battle of wills thus developed, with its center on the strategically unimportant island of Guadalcanal, and the contest finally cost both sides dearly.

By early July the Americans were getting ready to mount their very first amphibious operation of the war, an operation urgently brought forward when aerial reconnaissance showed that the Japanese were preparing an airstrip on Guadalcanal and a seaplane base on neighboring Tulagi. The landing, virtually unopposed, took place on '1 August and by 9 August apparently only mopping-up operations remained for the Americans.

Any complacency was rudely shattered on the night of 9 August when Vice-Admiral Gunichi Mikawa's cruisers bore in to inflict a bloody defeat off Savo Island on the naval forces covering the landing. This tactical defeat was, however, a strategic success for the enemy did not molest what should have been their prime target, the transports offshore. Even so, these felt obliged to withdraw for safety, leaving 16,000 US Marines unsupported ashore. Working feverishly in the damp, enervating heat, their engineers had the incomplete Japanese airstrip open for business by 15 August, and named it Henderson Field; it was to play a crucial role in the campaign. A trickle of supplies began to be flown in, reinforced by rapid trips from destroyer/transports.

On the night of 17/18 August nearly 1,000 Japanese troops were landed by high-speed transports escorted by seven fleet destroyers. Their speed was just sufficient to be in and out again within the hours of darkness, and their nocturnal activities were to become so regular as to be named the 'Tokyo Express'.

For a week the enemy ran in small parcels of troops to build up the strength to take the island, but even at this early stage they had to work by night as American air cover by day was too great a threat. In the early hours of 22 August the destroyer USS BIue (one of the pickets so ineffective a fortnight previously at Savo) was one of two radar-equipped ships sent to interdict the Japanese. Again they were surprised and the ship was heavily damaged by torpedoes from the Kawakaze. She was later scuttled and the enemy had claimed first blood.

On 24 August the enemy tried direct assault. While the inconclusive Battle of the Eastern Solomons was being fought between the main fleets to engage the American presence, a bombardment force of four destroyers under the redoubtable Rear-Admiral Raizo Tanaka ran a group of transports down 'The Slot', the long channel dividing the double chain of the Solomons. The destroyers duly 'softened up' Henderson Field but ad a transport set afire and the destroyer Mutsuki disabled because she dallied too long and was caught by daylight. The landing was called off and the Mutsuki scuttled.

By working out of the Shortlands, Tanaka was just beyond the range of the Henderson-based Douglas SBD bombers yet just able to oomplete a smart return trip in the dark hours. Thus three destroyers landed 350 men on the nigh of 26/27 August and 130 more on the following night. Overconfident, the Japanese then left to early on the next trip and were caught at dusk losing the Asagiri, her embarked troops and their supplies.

It became the custom for the enemy destroyers, once their supercargo had been rapidly offloaded, to spend a few minutes lobbing a valedictory salvo or two into the airfield perimeter. On 5/6 September the American destroyer/transports USS Gregory and USS Little tried to interfere and were both sunk.

By mid-September the situation ashore was Stalemated neither side having the strength to displace the other. The Japanese high command then made Guadalcanal a top-priority goal, withdrawing the all-important destroyers in rotation for modification. Stowage and AA weapons were increased for the loss of some main battery guns. Torpedoes were retained.

Supplemented by pottering Daihatsu barges, the destroyers built up the Japanese strength for an offensive. With the Americans in greater strength than anticipated, this was defeated, the destroyers having to run urgently needed replacements. Meanwhile, the Americans landed 4,000 more marines, but at the cost of the carrier USS Wasp and a destroyer from the covering force.

During October Tanaka's destroyers worked miracles, the nightly runs of the 'Tokyo Express' delivering 20,000 men with equipment. Henderson-based aircraft were a continuing aggravation and heavy cruisers came down on the night of 11/12 October to bombard the airfield. They ran straight into a superior American force that had been covering one of their own landings. In what became called the Battle of Cape Esperance the unsuspecting Japanese had their 'T' crossed and lost a cruiser and a destroyer. Two destroyers from the 'Express' were also sunk by aircraft at first light.

Determined to reduce Henderson, the Japanese bombed it heavily twice in daylight on 13 October, interfered with repairs to cratered airstrips by artillery fire and then, after dark, brought down two battle-cruisers. In a 90-minute bombardment the airfield was plastered with over 900 rounds of 356-mm ( 14-in) ammunition. Aviation spirit stocks and 48 aircraft were lost. More bombing on the following day was followed by '150 rounds of 203-mm (8-in) fire during the night from two heavy cruisers. Simultaneously, the 'Express' brought in heavy reinforcements in transports, gambling on the parlous state of Henderson's defenders to lie offshore during the day. Fielding everything that remained, the Americans destroyed three transports and forced Tanaka to withdraw. He returned with heavy cruisers on the night of 15/16 October, laying 900 rounds of 203-mm and 300 of 127-mm (5-in) fire within the shattered perimeter.

Impatient for a decision, the Japanese brought their main fleet south and engaged the new American commander, Vice-Admiral William F. Halsey, off Santa Cruz on 26 October. Though suffering a prohibitively expensive toll in aircraft and pilots, the Japanese succeeded in adding the carrier USS Hornet to the cost of Guadalcanal.

During the first 10 days of November alone Tanaka ran 65 destroyer sorties, his achievement being to see his side outnumber the Americans ashore by 30,000 to 29,000. The cost was three destroyers damaged.

The battle-cruiser Kirishima was overwhelmed by gunfire from the battleship USS Washington, and together with two American and one Japanese destroyer laid her bones alongside the remainder already littering what was now known as Ironbottom Sound.

The cost had resulted in only 2,000 of 7,000 Japanese troops actually being landed. The Americans now outnumbered their foe by 40,000 to 25,000 and only Tanaka could prevent disaster. His overworked destroyers were reduced to delivering supplies by rubberized containers, pushed overboard.

During the night of 30 November eight of his destroyers, cluttered with supplies and personnel, were surprised by an American force of five cruisers and six destroyers off Tassafaronga. The seasoned Japanese reacted instinctively and freely with torpedoes, while the less experienced Americans betrayed their positions by reliance on radar-laid gunfire. Four cruisers were torpedoed, one was lost. Tanaka lost one destroyer but had turned a potential defeat into victory and still delivered the goods.

Early December saw a spate of runs by up to 10 destroyers at a time, that on 12 December losing the destroyer Teruzuki to a PT boat's torpedoes. Mechanically unsound and bereft of air cover, the Japanese called a halt until the . next moonless phase in early January 1943. By now the Japanese high command had resolved on Guadalcanal being evacuated as un takable and, on 14 January 1943 Tanaka ran in 600 crack troops to act as rearguard. The evacuation itself was, unbelievably, not opposed. In three operations between 2 and 'I February, Tanaka used a cruiser and 20 destroyers to remove every last soldier: the Americans either did not appreciate the position or were just relieved to see the back of the Japanese, the only loss being a mined destroyer.

The island had cost the Americans about 1,600 troops, and many more sailors; the enemy had lost over 23,000. Both sides had lost 24 ships apiece of destroyer size and above in numerous skirmishes and seven major actions. The Japanese fleet, experienced but outnumbered, acquitted itself admirably; while the Americans, starting as 'rookies', stuck to their task, eventually emerging not only victorious but much the wiser.